

# **‘Difficult Development Partnerships’**

**An evidence-based approach to  
recovery for dysfunctional Aboriginal  
communities**



**Gregory Andrews, Project Manager,  
*Mutitjulu Working Together* Project, Uluru**

**November 2005**

**“Poor people are the main victims where the state is unable or unwilling to carry out its basic functions. Poor people also suffer where rulers use political office for personal or criminal ends or where there are weak governments that are either unable or unwilling to provide for their people”**

**Department for International Development, United Kingdom<sup>i</sup>**

Similarly, where decision-making and service provision systems in Aboriginal councils and organisations are dysfunctional, aspirations for improved human development will remain elusive.

## Contents

	Page
<b>Executive summary</b>	<b>1.</b>
<b>1. What are difficult development partnerships?</b>	<b>2.</b>
<b>2. Why do difficult development partnerships matter?</b>	<b>2.</b>
<b>3. What are the characteristics of difficult development partnerships?</b>	<b>3.</b>
<b>4. How to work in difficult development partnerships</b>	<b>6.</b>
<b>4.1 Robust analysis</b>	<b>7.</b>
<b>4.2 Transgenerational timeframes</b>	<b>8.</b>
<b>4.3 Realistic objectives and time-frames, and higher risks</b>	<b>8.</b>
<b>4.4 Law, order and governance</b>	<b>9.</b>
<b>4.5 Local ownership, participation, knowledge &amp; technology</b>	<b>11.</b>
<b>4.6 Gender</b>	<b>12.</b>
<b>4.7 Incentives</b>	<b>12.</b>
<b>4.8 Working together</b>	<b>14.</b>
<b>4.9 Employing and retaining the right people</b>	<b>15.</b>
<b>4.10 Maintaining services and meeting humanitarian needs</b>	<b>15.</b>
<b>5. Conclusion</b>	<b>17.</b>
<b>Table 1: Characteristics of difficult development partnerships</b>	<b>4.</b>
<b>Diagram 1: The difficult development partnership framework</b>	<b>6.</b>
<b>Box 1: AusAID's PNG Incentive Fund</b>	<b>13.</b>
<b>Box 2: Arguments for active intervention in service delivery</b>	<b>16.</b>
<b>Appendix A: The difficult development partnership framework and stakeholder perceptions</b>	<b>18.</b>
<b>Appendix B: Glossary</b>	<b>22.</b>
<b>Appendix C: Suggested Reading</b>	<b>23.</b>
<b>Appendix D: References</b>	<b>24.</b>

## Executive summary

The international community's experience with fragile states provides insights into solutions to the protracted problems in dysfunctional Aboriginal communities in remote Australia. There are, of course, differences between fragile states and dysfunctional Aboriginal communities - perhaps the most apparent is that Aboriginal communities are not nation states. But the relationships or 'partnerships' that international donors have with fragile states are in many circumstances comparable to Australian governments'<sup>1</sup> relations with Aboriginal communities and their representative institutions.

International donors have become increasingly focused on the issue of improving the effectiveness of their relations with fragile states where, despite on-going assistance, policy improvement and poverty reduction have not occurred. The costs of ignoring or abandoning these states would be exorbitant - from a humanitarian perspective but also in terms of global security. As Afghanistan has shown, "walking away carries a high price".<sup>ii</sup>

Recognising that traditional approaches have not worked and that disengagement is not an option, the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC)<sup>2</sup> is pursuing new and innovative approaches to what it calls 'difficult development partnerships'. It is progressively implementing a framework of evidence-based principles for working effectively in these environments. This framework is based on fostering policy reform over the medium to long-term, while also maintaining on-going service delivery that meets humanitarian needs. The concept of 'partnership' acknowledges that the protracted problems and solutions lie not only with fragile states themselves, but also with the policies and practices of developed countries.<sup>iii</sup>

Early indications are that the OECD's framework has produced "some positive and helpful insights and results".<sup>iv</sup> The framework involves:

1. Conducting robust analysis of the problems and their solutions;
2. Accepting that the process of change is trans-generational;
3. Maintaining realistic objectives and time-frames, and accepting higher risks;
4. Focusing on law, order and governance as foundations for development;
5. Maximising local ownership, participation, knowledge and technology in the development programs and projects;
6. Incorporating gender;
7. Introducing positive incentives that promote change for the better and removing perverse incentives that foster dysfunction;
8. Collaboration within and between governments and with non-government and private stakeholders;
9. Employing the right people; and
10. Maintaining service delivery throughout the long-term process required to secure sustainable development.

This paper examines the OECD's difficult development partnership framework in the context of Australian governments' relations with dysfunctional Aboriginal communities. The Mutitjulu *Working Together Project* at Uluru has provided an opportunity to apply the framework on a pilot basis. Early evidence suggests that it is achieving results and has potential to effect sustained change. As the Project's framework is further refined, the lessons learned will also have broader applicability in Indigenous Australia.

---

<sup>1</sup> Reference in this paper to 'Australian governments' includes national, state and territory authorities.

<sup>2</sup> The OECD DAC is the key international policy forum where bilateral donors - which collectively provide \$53 billion per annum in official development assistance - work together to foster effective and coordinated support for sustainable development and poverty reduction.

## 1. What are difficult development partnerships?

While definitions vary, the international development community defines difficult development partnerships as relations with partner states that are fragile and “cannot or will not deliver what citizens want or need to live decent, secure lives”.<sup>v</sup> These fragile states generally “fail to provide adequate public goods to their people, including safety and security, public institutions, economic management and basic social services”.<sup>vi</sup> There is no universally agreed list of fragile states. They represent a continuum. Examples of countries that might fall into the category of fragile states include Angola, Zimbabwe, and in Australia’s region, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the Solomon Islands.

There is a clear analogy between international donors’ difficult development partnerships with fragile states and Australian governments’ relations with so-called ‘dysfunctional’ Aboriginal communities. Dysfunctional communities are usually characterised by a socio-political environment where local leaders’ capacity and/or willingness to address serious and protracted dysfunction and deprivation is limited. While there is no universally agreed list of dysfunctional Aboriginal communities<sup>3</sup>, examples could include Muṭitjulu and Palm Island. Like fragile states, all remote communities are fragile in some respects and all communities have the potential to move in and out of dysfunctionality. Nomenclature and labels can also vary. No community likes to be labelled ‘dysfunctional’ and even in the most dysfunctional environments there are always elements of resilience and strength. Some analysts prefer to use language such as ‘communities in crisis’. But others argue the directness of the term ‘dysfunctional’ demonstrates the seriousness of the problem.

It is also important to acknowledge that dysfunctionality does not lie with communities alone. The relationships that governments have with communities are also part of the dysfunction. Ill designed government policies and programs, for example, are directly contributing to the serious problems confronting remote Aboriginal communities.

Notwithstanding the varying definitions, international experience and analysis has provided information on what works and what doesn’t in difficult development partnerships. This evidence has strong potential to be applied in Australia and has been tested on a preliminary basis in the Muṭitjulu *Working Together Project*.

## 2. Why do difficult development partnerships matter?

We need to work more effectively in difficult development partnerships with dysfunctional Aboriginal communities because (i) the human suffering caused by dysfunction is widespread, (ii) there are strong national interests at stake, and (iii) the costs of late response will be high and escalating.

The serious human and civil rights violations occurring in dysfunctional communities are well documented and publicised.<sup>vii</sup> In the midst of Australia’s plenty, the living standards of Aboriginal Australians in remote communities are “as deprived as some of the most disadvantaged people in the Third World”.<sup>viii</sup> Lawlessness and disorder are also significant problems with local and national Aboriginal leaders acknowledging that “communities not affected by disproportionate levels of social dysfunction and violence are today the exception rather than the rule”.<sup>ix</sup> Governments are thus morally obliged to respond.

---

<sup>3</sup> The Australian government maintains a ‘communities in crisis’ list. But this list is not nationally agreed and is influenced by national interests. While Muṭitjulu community at the base of Uluru is on the list, other similarly dysfunctional desert communities are not. At Muṭitjulu, national interests associated with Uluru-Kata Tjuta National Park are at stake.

The national interests that are at stake are substantive and growing. Muṯitjulu community at the base of Uluru provides a poignant example. Uluru is a major draw card of Australia's tourism industry and the engine of Central Australia's economy. Tourism at the Rock generates over 1,400 local jobs, \$300 million per annum in tourist spending and contributes to over three percent of the NT's GDP.<sup>x</sup> Australia also has international treaty obligations associated with Uluru Kata Tjuta National Park's World Heritage listing. Dysfunction at Uluru, if unaddressed, will affect these obligations and harm Australia's reputation as a safe international tourism destination.

While many other communities may not present the immediate and visible national interests of Muṯitjulu, the growing health and social costs associated with their dysfunction are huge. Instability associated with fragile states has proven to proliferate readily. Similarly, the problems associated with dysfunctional communities in remote Australia are spreading - including to regional Centres like Alice Springs. Petrol sniffers are already moving into Alice Springs and some stakeholders have begun to assert that if nothing is done, Central Australia will become "a giant care warehouse for brain-damaged sniffers, chronically ill drinkers and those with cannabis-induced psychosis".<sup>xi</sup> Communicable diseases such as STIs are high and growing in remote Aboriginal communities – many of the precursors for an HIV-AIDS epidemic are already existent.

The demographics of remote Australia mean that the costs of ignoring the dysfunction will grow exponentially. There are some 1,200 remote Aboriginal communities across Australia.<sup>xii</sup> In the NT, Aboriginal people already account for around one-third of the population. Around eighty per cent of these people reside in remote or very remote communities.<sup>xiii</sup> And the Aboriginal population is growing fast compared to the non-Aboriginal population. Indicative of this growth is the Aboriginal proportion of NT Primary School enrolments which is approaching 50 per cent - at a time when Aboriginal attendance rates, particularly in remote communities, are very low.<sup>4</sup> This trend has been described by one senior official as a 'demographic express train' which cannot be stopped.<sup>xiv</sup> Governments need to respond, and the longer it takes, the more costly the ultimate response will be. As the Aboriginal (and largely unemployed) share of the population grows exponentially compared to the non-Aboriginal (and working) share of the population, resources available to address the crisis will diminish while those needed to address it increase.

International research tells a similar story with fragile states imposing unexpectedly heavy costs on themselves and their neighbours. They remain fragile for a long time - on average 56 years - and the spill over effects of conflict, refugees, disease, and broader security issues are also disproportionately large and enduring.<sup>xv</sup>

### **3. What are the characteristics of difficult development partnerships?**

Fragile states share a range of characteristics analogous with dysfunctional communities in Australia. Most international difficult development partnerships occur with fragile states that are dependent on international aid and resource extraction or 'resource rents' for their revenue.<sup>xvi</sup> Relying on resource rents and international assistance to finance expenditure reduces the state's need for taxation which is crucial for building a social contract with its citizens. Economic historians have identified income tax as a key factor in the dramatic improvements in governance, democracy and accountability that occurred during the Western world's Industrial Revolution. Where the state collects little or no money from its citizens, they have limited expectations about its role as an effective, efficient and

---

<sup>4</sup> Some officials are already talking about a time in the near future when the NT education system will need to be turned up-side-down into an Indigenous system with special programs for non-Indigenous children.

equitable service provider. Relying on resource rents limits the possibility for the development of viable liberal democratic systems and encourages ‘rent seeking’ behaviour, which is further exacerbated in ethnically fragmented communities - the Middle East provides an example. Without the development of a broad and inclusive social contract between the state and its citizens, there is little or no accountability of the state to its populace. The objectives and actions of fragile states’ leaders are thus more easily misaligned with good development, adequate service provision and the protection of human rights.

Many fragile states also demonstrate vulnerability to external shocks. Their narrow resource bases and undiversified economies make them disproportionately susceptible to commodity price fluctuations and tourism market volatilities, for example. Fragile states are also more vulnerable to environmental shocks such as tsunamis and droughts. Vulnerability exacerbates the difficulty and risks of development.

Fragile states are usually characterised by high levels of corruption and obfuscated political and bureaucratic decision-making structures. Weak capacity and willingness for good governance - and lack of accountability - allow leaders to pursue objectives that are misaligned with national interests. Restricted authorising environments exacerbate business transaction costs and risks, thus hindering economic development. Human rights abuses and political repression are usually rife. And finally, most fragile states are usually suffering or emerging from violent conflict.<sup>xvii</sup>

Table 1 demonstrates the analogy between international donors’ difficult development partnerships with fragile states and Australian governments’ relations with dysfunctional Aboriginal communities. Most dysfunctional communities are highly dependent on welfare, royalties and sit-down payments. Community governance structures are frail and often unaccountable - not only downwards to community members but also upwards to government funding agencies which under the auspices of self-determination have often

**Table 1: Characteristics of difficult development partnerships**

<b>International – Fragile States</b>	<b>Australia – dysfunctional Aboriginal communities</b>
Resource and foreign aid dependent	Dependence on welfare economy. Narrow market economy based on natural resource extraction, art or tourism.
Vulnerability to external shocks	Dependence on art, tourism and natural resource extraction industries that are volatile and subject to external shocks. Vulnerability to external political and policy changes of State/Territory and Australian governments.
Weak governance and lack of accountability	Weak capacity and in some cases weak willingness for good governance. Community, Australian and State/Territory government resources misutilised.
Corruption and intransparency in decision-making	Disrupted and corrupted kinship networks, misuse of community funds and resources.
Restricted authorising environments for business	Complex and overlapping authorising environments - including traditional and mainstream. Violence and intimidation used in decision making.
Human rights abuses	Child-abuse, suicide, domestic violence, murder, drug-abuse, petrol sniffing, malnutrition, early death, kidney disease, diabetes, etc.
Suffering or emerging from conflict	Living history of conflict associated with dispossession. On-going conflict, lawlessness and violence associated with addiction-related dysfunction.

been unwilling to intervene when grant funding has not achieved desired outcomes. Local decision making processes are inconsistent, blurry and often influenced by the pervasive effects of addiction and violence. Community decision-making about resource allocation can involve corruption, intimidation, nepotism and violence. Most remote Aboriginal economies are narrow. Market-driven income generation opportunities are limited. Viable market economy opportunities are usually focused on resource extraction, art or tourism - which are vulnerable to external shocks. Many of the so-called 'real' jobs are filled by non-Indigenous people. Economic activities that do exist are usually communally rather than privately driven. And most individuals' participation is passive - involving attendance at meetings and the receipt of royalties rather than real work. Where social epidemics of addiction predominate, individuals are often dislocated from the customary economy which is an important and robust source of income and employment. In remote areas of the NT, Western Australia, South Australia and Queensland, conflict associated with dispossession is part of a living history. And the violence and dysfunction associated with social epidemics of addiction make life in many remote communities similar to a war zone. Communities like Mutitjulu display socioeconomic indicators analogous with conflict or post-conflict environments.<sup>xviii</sup>

DRAFT



#### 4. How to work in difficult development partnerships

The lessons learned from difficult development partnerships abroad have strong potential to guide interventions in dysfunctional Aboriginal communities. A primary strength of the difficult development partnership framework is that it is based on evidence, not opinion or ideology. The framework has provided a useful guide to the Mutitjulu *Working Together Project*. While the process of change being promoted in Mutitjulu is trans-generational and still in its early stages, it would be fair to say that it is building a basis for positive human development. An independent coronial inquest into petrol sniffing in the Central Deserts found that the Project was an “excellent and commendable initiative” which had “achieved a number of significant gains and made positive steps forward in Mutitjulu”.<sup>xix</sup>

**Diagram 1: The difficult development partnership framework**



‘Difficult development partnership framework’, by Gregory Andrews

The difficult development partnership framework is illustrated in [Diagram 1](#)<sup>5</sup>. The principles are mutually reinforcing. They are elaborated below. They also match stakeholder perceptions of principles necessary for working in Mutitjulu ([Appendix A](#)).

<sup>5</sup> [Diagram 1](#) is an example of the application of these principles. By presenting the Project’s difficult development partnership framework using local technology and knowledge, it aims to maximise participation and local understanding.

## 4.1 Robust analysis

One of the most significant lessons learned from difficult development partnerships is the critical importance of robust up-front analysis. On the basis of its experience in dealing with fragile states, the World Bank argues that donors should conduct “rigorous socio-political analysis” to help identify feasible targets for change, as well as the best ways of promoting them.<sup>xx</sup> Aboriginal people in Mutitjulu agree. One Old Man likened the need for analysis to the use of the scope on his gun when hunting kangaroo:

“When I hunt maḷu (kangaroo) if I don’t use that scope or get it right, I might miss that maḷu ... go home hungry. But if I take time ... take care ... get that scope right. Then I’ll hit that maḷu ... maybe with only one bullet”.<sup>xxi</sup>

Good analysis is particularly important where the capacity and motivation of political leaders for change are weak - often the case in dysfunctional communities. Analysing and understanding the underlying factors supporting or subverting positive change is critical to ensuring that approaches to Aboriginal community development are successful. Evidence has proven that analysis needs to be firmly based on broad local community perspectives, not just ideas of the elite or those who have captured power. It should also identify the needs and requirements of interest groups, the effects of proposed reforms on them, and their likely response. The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) refers to this analytical strategy as a ‘drivers for change’ approach.<sup>xxii</sup>

Australian governments need to have a much clearer understanding of the reasons for governance failure in dysfunctional communities. While some explanations such as lack of cultural legitimacy in Aboriginal governance structures are likely to be shared among many dysfunctional communities, other reasons will vary from place to place. Some community leaders will have commitment but be lacking capacity. Or they may have given up, after trying for years to secure change and becoming discouraged and exhausted. Others will have vested interests and be uncommitted to the pursuit of good governance. Some will be lacking both capacity and commitment. Consequently, key elements of analysis need to include the history of a community and its people, who holds power and how it is brokered and used, the informal ‘rules of the game’ such as how patronage networks operate, and the relationship between these and formal institutions.

A range of development analysis has guided the *Working Together Project*. This has included an initial scoping paper based on participatory learning which assessed the development environment and made recommendations for immediate and longer-term measures for change;<sup>xxiii</sup> analysis of the incentive frameworks surrounding passive welfare dependency which was identified by stakeholders as a major factor contributing to community dysfunction;<sup>xxiv</sup> analysis of the causes of, and solutions to, petrol sniffing and other forms of substance abuse producing egregious social harm<sup>xxv</sup>; and this paper outlining the Project’s difficult development partnership framework. Further work will include analysis of the governance problems in the community and suggestions for reform, and the development of substance abuse and youth development strategies. Partners have also agreed that the *Working Together Project* should be evaluated on an on-going basis and that this analysis should guide its future direction.

### *Robust analysis – key questions*

- How can governments develop the detailed community and cultural understandings and knowledge that analysis requires?
- What role can communities play themselves in analysis?
- Can stakeholders accept the consequences of robust analysis which may be critical of past and current practices?

## 4.2 Transgenerational timeframes

A critical lesson from international experience is that the process of change needed to address difficult development partnerships is transgenerational and requires long-term commitment. Western states developed their systems of democratic governance over hundreds of years - not over years or even over decades. Notwithstanding technological and other improvements, it remains unreasonable to expect dysfunctional states to develop and implement new systems of governance overnight. International donors are therefore making increasing use of longer-term planning mechanisms.<sup>6</sup>

Similarly, overcoming difficult development partnerships with Aboriginal communities is a transgenerational process. Indicative of this is evidence from the Central Deserts where 80 per cent of petrol sniffers come from families characterised by social and cultural breakdown associated with alcohol misuse.<sup>xxvi</sup> As one Old Lady in Mutitjulu said, “Parents are on the grog ... kids, ... they sniff petrol”.<sup>xxvii</sup> The fact that in Central Desert communities young pregnant women can sit and sniff petrol unchallenged next to their mothers, or that women can be seen pushing prams while sniffing petrol, is a direct example of the transgenerational nature of dysfunction.

Transgenerational dysfunction requires transgenerational solutions. The design and implementation of community development projects need to be extended beyond year-to-year funding. Stakeholders must also accept different evaluation criteria and mechanisms. Mutitjulu community has called for the continuation of the *Working Together Project* from when “the Tjitji-tjuta [little ones] grow up into Wati-tjuta [men] and Minyma-tjuta [women]”.<sup>xxviii</sup> Project partners are planning its extension for an additional three years. While still a relatively short timeframe, this represents a positive change from the norm for Aboriginal communities of year-to-year funding.

### *Transgenerational timeframes – key questions*

- How can governments maintain long-term engagement when in the short-term minimal development outcomes may be apparent?
- How can the need for long-term commitment be balanced with year-to-year budgetary cycles and Westminster political cycles?

## 4.3 Realistic objectives and time-frames and higher risks

Linked to transgenerational timeframes is the importance of setting realistic objectives. Given the ‘dearth of capacity’ in difficult development partnerships, goals need to be modest, particularly in the short to medium term.<sup>xxix</sup> International experience has shown that positive change will be slow and incremental. Progress needs to be measured against the direction of improvement rather than absolute standards. Governments and other stakeholders need to allow sufficient time for improvements and to accept that they cannot give up if change (over the short term, at least) is not at their desired pace. Accepting that the risk environments in difficult development partnerships are different is also important. Building capacity and sustainability is about empowering people and institutions. So there will be failures. Canada’s international aid agency has compared its difficult development partnership strategy to a game of snakes and ladders.<sup>xxx</sup> The path to sustained recovery from dysfunction will involve opportunities and setbacks. Pursuing these ‘ladders’ and managing these ‘snakes’ requires pragmatism, realistic expectations, program flexibility, and continuous assessment of partner capacities.

<sup>6</sup> International donors acknowledge that a country like Zimbabwe, which has only recently entered into fragility, will not emerge from it “within the life time of anyone working in an aid agency”.

Stakeholders need to be flexible and responsive in finding ‘ladders’ which may often be initiatives that fall outside traditional funding mechanisms or guidelines. Increased flexibility and acceptance of risks should not, however, mean less accountability.

The *Working Together Project*’s course in Muṭitjulu has included a few snakes. In early December 2004, petrol sniffers attempted to burn down the adult education building. During the Christmas school holidays numerous fires were lit by Muṭitjulu youth in the National Park - one resulted in an evacuation of part of Ayers Rock Resort. In May 2005, the childcare centre closed for around four weeks due to conflict and intimidation of its workers. Importantly, the Project’s partners did not interpret these setbacks as failures or reasons to disengage. External stakeholders and community members accepted the ‘snakes’ and searched quickly for the next ‘ladder’. The childcare centre, for example, reopened after community members became more aware of the centre’s foundational role in their children’s development and the council took action to resolve the dispute.

*Objectives and risks - key questions*

- Are different measures of success necessary for working in difficult development partnerships? How can they be developed?
- How can governments be convinced of the need to accept higher risks of failures?

#### **4.4 Law, order and governance**

Improving governance, and eliminating corruption, nepotism and intimidation in decision-making are crucial to resolving difficult development partnerships. The World Bank’s ground-breaking report *Assessing Aid: What works, what doesn’t and why?* demonstrated the overwhelming importance of good governance for successful development outcomes.<sup>xxxix</sup> Where governance and institutions are weak, “personalities often dominate ... and in the worst cases, predatory leaders unchecked by institutional constraints can steal property, kill people and ruin the economy”.<sup>xxxix</sup> The evidence from Native American communities is similar. According to the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development:

“Self-rule alone is not enough to produce economic growth. Sovereignty must be exercised effectively if it is to lead to significant and sustainable development.”<sup>xxxix</sup>

Good governance requires inclusive institutions that respond to the interests of the wider population not just a few. But dysfunctional Aboriginal communities in Australia are often characterised by weak local governance and the capture and misuse of power by a minority of people - Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal. In Muṭitjulu, after discovering the extent of governance disorder, one council member said, “everything has been turned upside down and we didn’t know, ... , now we have to turn it back the right way”.<sup>xxxix</sup>

Capacity building and training can help to improve good governance in dysfunctional communities. But not where there is a lack of willingness for good governance among those in power.<sup>7</sup> In these cases, Australian governments have a responsibility to intervene and demand good governance as a funding condition. Under the auspices of so-called ‘self-determination’, governments have often been reluctant to intervene. Turning a blind eye to mismanagement, corruption and nepotism has implicitly legitimised dysfunctional behaviours and allowed a few people to self-determine at the expense of Aboriginal communities as a whole. But demanding accountability and good governance as a

---

<sup>7</sup> Local ‘political will’ for good governance is, of course, also a function of institutional appropriateness. Where institutions are culturally legitimate and locally relevant, the incentives for Aboriginal people to pursue good governance are stronger.

condition of grant funding does not intrude on Aboriginal self-determination. Indeed, it ensures that funding investments deliver broad-based outcomes rather than benefiting only the elite who hold power. Demanding good governance thus sets the groundwork for real self-determination.

All Australian citizens deserve the right to good local government. And this is recognised in mainstream society. In 2004, for example, Jabiru Town Council was stood down and replaced by an NT government administrator due to concerns about conflicts of interest, staff harassment by some elected members, and actions by some councillors that were designed to prevent the transaction of business necessary for good governance. The NT government argued that its intervention was necessary to “ensure that local government functions were performed”.<sup>xxxv</sup> Despite many dysfunctional communities’ governance practices being worse than those at Jabiru prior to its council’s dismissal, Australian governments continue to appear reluctant to intervene. Governments cannot continue tolerating corruption and mismanagement if real and sustainable human development in dysfunctional communities is to be achieved.

A critical precursor to good governance is law and order. Unless people feel physically safe, they cannot improve their livelihoods and thus remain trapped in poverty.<sup>xxxvi</sup> In remote Aboriginal communities where law and order is lacking, people remain trapped in dysfunction and cannot exercise their rights or responsibilities. Lawlessness in some settlements has become so acute that it has produced a “new dysfunctional culture” with communities becoming “machines producing egregious social disintegration”.<sup>xxxvii</sup> In Mutitjulu, some Elders have been forced out of their homes and into the sand dunes for their safety. This significantly limits their ability to exercise their cultural authority. Similarly, without the rule of law youth workers attempting to divert young people from substance abuse face violence and intimidation from local drug and petrol dealers.

International experience has shown that carefully shaped intervention to secure law and order - such as Australia did in the Solomon Islands - can achieve results without being neo-colonial or unacceptably intrusive.<sup>xxxviii</sup> Similar interventions are necessary in dysfunctional Aboriginal communities if their recovery is to be real and sustainable. Leaving law and order to dysfunctional community Night Patrols is at best inadequate and more likely damaging because it empowers those who are perpetuating the violence and abuse. Of course, where there is both capacity and willingness in a community to run an effective Night Patrol, this should be supported - particularly because it is consistent with principles of local ownership and participation in community development projects.

*Law, order and governance - key questions*

- How do we build political willingness for improved governance?
- What are the key governance institutions and how can they be supported?
- How do we identify and support champions for change?
- How do we identify and mitigate the influence of those with strong vested interests for maintaining dysfunction?
- How do we manage structural adjustment associated with strengthened law enforcement?

## 4.5 Local ownership, participation, knowledge and technology

Maximising local ownership and participation, and the use of local knowledge and technology is critical for long-term development.<sup>xxxix</sup> Communities need a sense of ownership and control if they are to participate actively in their development trajectory and if it is to be sustainable.

Aboriginal Australians have a wealth of traditional knowledge, culture and governance structures that have allowed them to survive on and manage this continent for thousands of years. Although these systems have been weakened since dispossession, this should not discount their potential. The Thamurrurr model of cultural legitimacy that has been applied in Wadeye in the NT, for example, has been an important success factor in improved development outcomes achieved there.<sup>xi</sup> It is clear that the communities which have maintained or adapted their traditions and are utilising and applying local knowledge and technology effectively are also those enjoying the greatest stability and are least disturbed by the malaise of substance abuse and passive welfare.

Promoting the customary economy can be a valuable part of the development equation for remote Aboriginal communities. The customary economy contributes around \$70,000 worth of food per annum to the average outstation of 25 people in West Arnhem Land.<sup>xli</sup> This customary activity generates imputed income and food. Importantly, it also enhances people's physical, emotional and cultural wellbeing.

But Aboriginal ownership and participation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for success.<sup>xlii</sup> To be truly effective, participation must be inclusive and representative. It cannot be captured, concentrated and misused by a few. A critical ingredient for promoting broad participation and ownership is the use of participatory and inclusive approaches to development. Community development workers need strong cross-cultural communication and language skills and must utilise inter-cultural media tools. These techniques have been crucial for the promotion of more 'informed' decision-making in the *Working Together Project*. Another participatory mechanism employed in Mutitjulu has been the active inclusion of women – see Chapter 4.6.

Community radio broadcasting can be an effective means of disseminating information and engaging people – particularly where literacy levels are low. Re-opening Mutitjulu's radio station was identified by community members and other stakeholders as an important immediate measure for change in the *Working Together Project*. The radio station has become a stimulating diversionary activity for young people who use it to play music and broadcast messages across the Anangu Pitjantjatjara lands. And Elders discuss culture and history which reinforces their authority and connects them with the youth.

### *Local ownership, knowledge and technology - key questions*

- How can local participation be maximised when motivation is weak?
- Whose capacity should we be building? Community councils, women, individuals?
- What role can external stakeholders play in building social capital?
- How can broad participation be achieved?

## 4.6 Gender

Decades of development practice have proven that projects are more successful if women are included. According to the United Nations:

“Gender inequality is an obstacle to progress, a roadblock on the path of human development. When development is not ‘en-gendered’ it is ‘endangered’”.<sup>xliii</sup>

Women in many dysfunctional Aboriginal communities are being forced to step outside their cultural bounds of authority to fill decision-making and leadership gaps created by men’s participation in substance abuse, violence and dysfunction. But they often lack supporting structures - both Aboriginal and Western. This further heightens the need to incorporate gender in the difficult development partnerships that Australian governments have with dysfunctional communities. Evidence has shown that it is also important for men to understand why women should be involved – otherwise they are likely to resist measures of inclusion or disengage.

Women have been engaged directly and actively in the *Working Together Project*. At its first meeting, the Project invited the Nyangatjatjara Pitjantjatjara Yangkuntjatjara (NPY) Women’s Council to join. This inclusion gave women a platform to assert their interests and influence the Project’s direction. An Executive member of the NPY Women’s Council residing in Mutitjulu, along with some other strong women, has been a significant driver for change. Women have been active proponents for the establishment of a police presence in the community and they have formed alliances and used *Working Together Project* meetings to confront stakeholders who have resisted stronger policing. Women have been supported through the Project by special initiatives including peer support and networking with Aboriginal women from other communities. They have increasingly attended community council meetings as observers even though they have not had the opportunity to vote as council members. And with the encouragement of the Australian government, the council has reformed its constitution to guarantee women half of its seats. As one Old Lady said:

“We women are on a track to a better future for our community. But you men sit here talking and filling your bellies. Then you follow the track to Yulara<sup>8</sup>”.<sup>xliiv</sup>

### *Gender - key questions*

- How can external stakeholders connect with women more effectively?
- How can the increasing role of women be supported and culturally legitimised in dysfunctional environments?

## 4.7 Incentives

Incentives have a powerful influence on development outcomes. International analysis has shown that successful development requires “tools to co-opt and coerce, targeted packages of sanctions and incentives”.<sup>xlv</sup> An incentive can be regarded as anything that encourages, urges, or provokes change. Positive incentives can drive people and organisations to strive for better development outcomes. They do this in two ways. First, by sharpening the targeting of funding and creating competition they can ensure that the most effective organisations are chosen for funding. These incentives are called ‘contestable mechanisms’. Second, incentives can mobilise commitment to program or project aims. For example, people in an organisation may become more determined to bring about positive change if there are tangible benefits to be gained or significant costs

<sup>8</sup> The hotel at the Yulara tourist resort functions like a de facto ‘wet-canteen’ for the drinkers at Mutitjulu.

to be borne for not changing. These benefits can be money, but they don't have to be. They can include things such as status, job security, opportunities, better working environments, access to family and community facilities. These types of incentives are referred to as 'targeted performance allocations'.<sup>xlvi</sup>

Gaining a better understanding of the incentives structures that operate in dysfunctional Aboriginal communities is crucial to securing sustainable solutions and recovery from dysfunction. The perverse incentives that detract from long-term development and capacity building need to be identified and understood. At the same time, positive incentives need to be strengthened or introduced.

Indigenous affairs commentators and Aboriginal leaders have outlined some of the perverse incentives driving alcohol and substance abuse epidemics in remote communities - particularly those surrounding passive welfare, and governance and land-tenure systems.<sup>xlvii</sup> The *Working Together Project's* discussion paper on economic passivity and dependency analysed the incentive frameworks surrounding passive welfare and royalties and made some recommendations for change.

The small size and remoteness of many dysfunctional Aboriginal communities may reduce the size of the 'market' for incentives that operate as 'contestable mechanisms'. But incentives can be introduced that encourage competition between communities as well as within them. Enforcing actively the conditionality of funding commitments and rewarding communities that perform well with more funding over longer periods of time can be powerful incentives for good governance - at local but also regional and national levels. This, in turn, can improve allocative efficiency by ensuring that funding investments are targeted through organisations and communities that produce better outcomes. AusAID's PNG Incentive Fund provides an example of how 'contestable incentive mechanisms' can operate - see Box 1. The Australian Research Council's (ARC) targeted research grants scheme is another example of the benefits of contestability. Each dollar invested through the ARC results in at least five times more publications than each dollar allocated through non-contestable processes.<sup>xlviii</sup>

The Australian government, which controls around 75 per cent of Mutitjulu community council's core funding, introduced a direct incentive for better governance in late September 2005 by informing the council that its future funding would be dependent on good governance and structural reforms. This conditionality provided an incentive for the community council to consolidate and implement reforms that it had been considering for over one year - in particular to include designated seats for women on the council, to reincorporate under the Office of the Registrar for Aboriginal Corporations and to extend council members' terms.

**Box 1: AusAID's PNG Incentive Fund (PNGIF)**

The PNGIF is a \$30 million per annum facility that uses incentive-based approaches to encourage private and public sector organisations in PNG to contribute more effectively to national development. It uses incentives to motivate behaviour change by awarding resources only to strongly performing organisations. A review of the PNGIF confirmed that incentive based aid works if care is taken over a few principles, including:

- careful consideration of who should be competing for awards;
- comparison of contestants' current performance with their own in the past, rather than making unfair cross-sectional comparisons;
- clear, realistic, objective, and verifiable allocation criteria for those competing; and
- criteria must accord with Australia's development objectives.



*Incentives - key questions*

- How do we design incentives that effectively encourage positive change and reform?
- What are the perverse incentives that are fostering dysfunction?
- How do we introduce incentives within and between communities?

## **4.8 Working Together**

Coordinating and integrating stakeholder approaches is universally recognised as imperative for successful development. When actors harmonise their interventions, resources can be used more effectively and administrative costs minimised. But collaboration is not easy and as development practitioners have observed, “everybody likes coordination, but no-one likes being coordinated”.<sup>xlix</sup>

While there are difficulties in working more closely together, enhanced collaboration can occur incrementally. It can begin with relatively easy cooperation such as sharing analysis, and then extend to more complex and challenging group efforts such as the adoption of whole-of-government approaches and pooled funding. The *Working Together Project* is itself an example of improved stakeholder coordination through whole-of-government/whole-of-community approaches.<sup>9</sup> Individual initiatives emanating from the Project have also had strong whole-of-government emphasis.

The Australian and NT governments’ agreement to share the costs of building and establishing a police post in Mutitjulu provides a good example of the benefits of ‘working together’. Without inter-governmental collaboration, improved law and order would have been difficult to secure. The Australian and NT governments’ announcement in September 2005 of a regional approach to address petrol sniffing through the provision of un-sniffable fuel, increased youth diversion activities, and a crack-down on drug and petrol trafficking provides another positive example. A collaborative approach was particularly important given the cross-jurisdictional nature of petrol sniffing in the Central Deserts.

The *Working Together Project* has also promoted local collaboration to secure successful outcomes. A whole-of-community child nutrition and hygiene program was developed after teachers identified the need urgently to address the problem of children arriving at school “starving, filthy and chronically ill”.<sup>1</sup> The Project facilitated collaboration among a range of community and external organisations to develop a program that addresses the children’s immediate needs, while also reminding parents of their personal responsibilities to feed and clothe their children, and generating employment opportunities for local people. Contributions came from the school, the community council, the health clinic, the community store, the NT health department and individuals.

*Working together - key questions*

- How can government’s collaborate more effectively?
- How do we deal with the conflicting interests of different stakeholders?
- Who are the non-government stakeholders that need to engage?

---

<sup>9</sup> While ‘working together’ has not been without frustrations, a diverse group of stakeholders - governments, Aboriginal organisations, non-government organisations and the private sector - have remained engaged and have achieved real results.

## 4.9 Employing and retaining the right people

Employing and retaining the right people is crucial for successful development. Evaluations have consistently shown that an ability to communicate cross-culturally is more important than the technical skills of development practitioners. Dysfunctional communities need people with the right skills and expertise. But if they are to build real capacity in Aboriginal communities, they must also have an ability and commitment to share and transfer these competencies. They also need to be adequately trained, rewarded and supported so that they can sustain their work.

The character and behaviour of people working on Aboriginal communities is also critical. It would be fair to say that the acute shortage of quality personnel across remote Australia has contributed to a permissive approach to the employment of inappropriate people. Stories from across remote Aboriginal Australia confirm the pervasive and negative effects of recruiting dubious people with criminal backgrounds. Program interventions have been significantly weakened by these permissive attitudes which also send confusing messages. Failure to conduct proper police and background checks has not only damaged programs, but also put children and youth at risk.

Residents of dysfunctional communities readily acknowledge that many non-Aboriginal people working for organisations that are supposed to be supporting their community's development supply them with alcohol and drugs. Some non-Indigenous people working in dysfunctional communities argue that Aboriginal people need to be 'taught how to drink' or 'use drugs responsibly'. The employment of such people in communities suffering from addiction epidemics and that have made democratic decisions to declare themselves 'dry' cannot be tolerated. As one Aboriginal leader has said:

"it goes without saying that, if we are serious about attacking these problems, it is unthinkable to have anything to do with white people who use illicit drugs or tolerate such behaviour in their families or associate with such people. Such people must be removed from our organisations."<sup>li</sup>

### *Employing the right people - key questions*

1. How do we attract people with the right skills mix?
2. How do we reward and retain good people and get rid of the wrong people?
3. How do we avoid recruiting the wrong people?

## 4.10 Maintaining basic services and meeting humanitarian needs

Service delivery is an area where Australian governments need to intervene more strongly if they are truly to resolve difficult development partnerships in dysfunctional communities. A key indicator of dysfunction in Aboriginal communities is the breakdown of local service delivery.

Where service delivery provided locally under the auspices of self-determination breaks down, a vicious and deepening spiral of dysfunction emerges and human-rights abuses worsen. Deepening dysfunction is inevitable where local leaders are unable or unwilling to use government funding to run an adequate Night Patrol program, for example. Or indeed, where they use the Night Patrol to deal drugs and run illegal grog into their community. Likewise, youth diversion programs that sponsor drug dealers to provide petrol sniffers with marijuana as a substitute for petrol, do more harm than good.

The World Bank has emphasised that providing more resources for local service delivery mechanisms is not a realistic way to improve basic health and education outcomes in most fragile states because conventional channels of local service provision are highly unsatisfactory. While people living in these environments desperately need basic social services, “increasing the flow of finance is unlikely to be effective”.<sup>lii</sup> How the funds are spent and by whom should be the paramount consideration. Otherwise, increased funding will at best be wasted, and very likely produce greater harm. Adequate financial resources are thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for addressing dysfunction.

**Box 2: Arguments for active intervention in service delivery\***

There are four main reasons for working with external actors, such as international NGOs, to deliver basic services in fragile states:

1. Poverty will not be reduced without access to services;
2. There is a humanitarian imperative to respond to emergency situations where access to services has been severely or completely diminished;
3. Service delivery may offer an entry point for triggering longer-term change;
4. Service delivery may help to prevent some states from sliding back into civil conflict.

\*DFID, Approaches to Improving the Delivery of Social Services in Difficult Environments, October 2004.

In fragile states, donors and NGOs operate in a grey area between humanitarian aid and development. This allows them to meet the needs of people and also shape longer-term plans for sustainable locally-provided service delivery. The starting point is to strengthen what works.<sup>liii</sup> If local authorities are delivering services effectively, they should be encouraged and supported. But where they are unable and unwilling to do so, governments cannot hold back from intervening and must direct resources through other channels. Intervention does not necessarily need to involve a trade-off with building sustainable self-governing systems. There are ways of intervening to provide basic services - through both external and local suppliers - that do not undermine local capacity. Indeed, some of these may even strengthen it.

Even if external agencies are delivering services, local organisations and individuals can still be included and consulted. And where external organisations are engaged in service provision, they demonstrate effective service delivery practices. This hopefully encourages positive changes in the way local authorities operate. This has happened in Bangladesh where NGOs are responsible for health and education services and where there has been a consistent improvement in people’s health and education over the past two decades.<sup>liv</sup>

Of course, there will be times when it is necessary to bypass local institutions altogether. When dysfunctional community councils are severely weakened or unwilling to deliver basic social services, Australian governments have a responsibility to step in to protect basic human rights and secure law and order:

“Governments have been wary in the past of intervening. They've provided funding and then walked away under the auspices of self-determination. But the young petrol sniffers who are dying, the mothers who are being raped and bashed, and the children who have sexually transmitted diseases are not self-determinating. If local community councils are unwilling or unable to use government funding appropriately then governments have to step in with professional support and conditionality to make sure the money is spent well. And if it's not, deliver the services through other providers.”<sup>lv</sup>

Where governments do intervene, flexible approaches are needed that allow for a transition from service delivery to capacity development as local capacity and willingness revive. The possibility for eventual transfer back to local ownership needs to be built in.

### *Maintaining service delivery - key questions*

- How do we balance local ownership and ‘self determination’ with the need to provide services that protect basic human rights?
- What are the alternative service delivery mechanisms available?
- Is the community self-determining or are a few people in power selfish-determinating?
- How do we mitigate the danger that external service delivery may reduce a community’s momentum for reform?

## **5. Conclusion**

In many Aboriginal communities the effects of dysfunction are egregious and escalating. For humanitarian reasons alone, this degradation cannot be ignored. But there are also strong national and economic interests at stake.

If development projects in dysfunctional Aboriginal communities are to be effective over the long term, they need to follow evidence-based principles rather than ideologies. The international community’s difficult development partnership framework is based on the evidence of dealing with fragile states and is achieving results.

The Mutitjulu *Working Together Project* has demonstrated, at least in the short-term, that the evidence-based principles of the difficult development partnership framework can deliver results in dysfunctional Aboriginal communities. There is thus strong potential for this framework to be applied more broadly in Australia, particularly given that dysfunctional Aboriginal communities share many of the characteristics of fragile states.

While the principles in the framework are mutually reinforcing and compatible over the long-term, their implementation sometimes requires compromise. There may be a need to balance local ownership and participation, for example, with the need to deliver basic services that protect human rights. Direct external intervention to maintain law, order and good governance, or to provide adequate health and education services, may be necessary if local Aboriginal organisations are unable or unwilling to provide these effectively. While there may appear to be a short-term trade-off between service delivery and maximising local ownership and participation, effective service delivery will enable greater and more active local participation over the long-term. In addition, external perceptions of local participation and ownership, may in fact have been obfuscated. In reality, participation could be focused among an elite who are self-determinating at the expense of the community as a whole. Likewise, assertions that intervention may represent a new form of ‘assimilation’ ignore the reality that many people in dysfunctional communities are already being assimilated into a deepening culture of addiction and violence.

Open, honest and on-going monitoring and evaluation of the *Working Together Project* and other initiatives like it will provide opportunities to refine the difficult development partnership framework further and to distil and disseminate lessons learned from it. This strengthening of the difficult development partnership framework will help address the dysfunction and deprivation that is causing so much harm in Mutitjulu and many other dysfunctional Aboriginal communities.

## Appendix A: Matching evidence-based principles for working in difficult development partnerships with stakeholder perspectives

The *Working Together Project* Manager conducted participatory exercises to distil stakeholder's perspectives of good development practices. Consultation occurred with the Project's formal Working Group but also with local community members. Stakeholders' perspectives are summarised and matched below with the evidence-based principles of the difficult development partnership framework.

Evidence-based principle	Stakeholder perspectives
Conducting robust analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>When I go hunting kangaroo I need to take time to get the scope right on my gun. If I don't I might miss that Kangaroo and waste my efforts. This project is the same, we need to get the scope right</i></li> <li>• <i>Track Wiya!</i> (there's no track for our future)</li> <li>• Better analysis of the situation at the beginning</li> <li>• Importance of baseline assessment</li> <li>• Acknowledgement of existing progress and processes</li> <li>• Ongoing participatory evaluation and analysis</li> <li>• Prioritise targeted change such as leadership relations</li> <li>• Focus on processes as well as outcomes</li> <li>• Streamlined reporting to government agencies</li> </ul>
Accepting transgenerational timeframes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>We need this project from now when our children are young until they have grown up</i></li> <li>• Long-term plans and projects</li> <li>• Guaranteed and sustained funding</li> <li>• Longer-term funding commitments from governments for programs – avoid one-off grants</li> <li>• Responsibility for children's care, well-being and education</li> <li>• Education and training</li> <li>• Foster personal responsibility</li> </ul>
Maintaining realistic objectives and accepting higher risks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>We might make some mistakes, but this is our place so you've gotta give us a go</i></li> <li>• Realism about community capacity and willingness for involvement</li> </ul>

## Appendix A: Matching evidence-based principles for working in difficult development partnerships with stakeholder perspectives

Evidence-based principle	Stakeholder perspectives
Focusing strongly on law and order and governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Real projects that deliver (including in the short-term)</li> <li>• <i>Everything has been upside down and we didn't know ... now we need to turn it back the right way</i> (Elder taking about governance structure of the Council and its business arms)</li> <li>• <i>We need to work with the police and the police have to protect us from violence and keep us safe. Grasses are coming into Mutitjulu like the Emu poison grass which we once used to hunt. This new poison is killing us instead of Emus</i></li> <li>• <i>Old people are afraid for their safety. They might be attacked</i></li> <li>• Support community to re-establish traditional and western law and order</li> <li>• Need for personal safety</li> <li>• Strong council with the ability to stand up to trouble makers, drug dealers and grog runners</li> <li>• Combining community justice and respect for Australian law</li> <li>• Informed decision-making by Aboriginal governance structures</li> <li>• Clear protocols</li> <li>• Build capacity all the way through governance</li> </ul>
Maximising local participation, ownership, knowledge and technology in programs and projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The Council should talk for the community and decide about resources</i></li> <li>• <i>We need more Inma (ceremony and culture) in school</i></li> <li>• Be responsive to needs identified by the community</li> <li>• Ownership of issues by the community</li> <li>• Community ownership of goals and objectives</li> <li>• Community ownership and control over key decisions about resource allocations and priorities of project</li> <li>• Participatory evaluation and analysis</li> <li>• Support community to re-establish traditional and western law and order</li> <li>• Community justice programs</li> </ul>

## Appendix A: Matching evidence-based principles for working in difficult development partnerships with stakeholder perspectives

Evidence-based principle	Stakeholder perspectives
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote informed decision-making by Aboriginal governance structures</li> <li>• Improve capacity of community members to participate in training and have work opportunities and experience</li> <li>• Local language and interpreters both ways</li> </ul>
Incorporating gender	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The women are on a path to a better future for this community, but the men keep following the track to drinking. We want you men to join us on our track</i></li> <li>• Focus on mums and young people for the way forward</li> </ul>
Using incentives to encourage change for the better and removing perverse incentives that encourage dysfunction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Paying people for their ceremony business just frees up their other money [like that from Centerlink] so they can keep spending on grog and marijuana.</i></li> <li>• <i>Sit-down money is killing our children. We've got to overcome the welfare mentality.</i></li> <li>• <i>Young people sniff petrol because they are bored .... they have nothing to do.</i></li> <li>• Incentives rather than disincentives.</li> <li>• Combining conditionality with incentives is important – you need the stick and the carrot.</li> </ul>
Working together within and between governments and also with non-government and private stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>It is important to be like the processionary caterpillars that have lived out here in the desert since the Tjukurpa began. They only survive by working together</i></li> <li>• Streamlined approaches by governments and other external agencies</li> <li>• Streamlined reporting to government agencies between parties</li> <li>• Develop stronger working partnerships including information sharing</li> <li>• Improve communication</li> <li>• Support by project Working Group for project staff</li> <li>• Agreed decision-making processes among stakeholders</li> <li>• Clear protocols for Working Group and project</li> <li>• Clear direction by Working Group</li> </ul>

## Appendix A: Matching evidence-based principles for working in difficult development partnerships with stakeholder perspectives

Evidence-based principle	Stakeholder perspectives
Employing the right people	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Right person for the right job</li> <li>• Support communities to recruit key staff</li> <li>• Employ trained and proven staff in communities</li> <li>• Personal safety of workers</li> <li>• Working Group support of project manager</li> <li>• Good communication</li> <li>• Cross-cultural awareness</li> <li>• Compulsory language training</li> <li>• Encourage personal responsibility</li> </ul>
Maintaining service delivery throughout the long-term process to sustainable development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>We've got to work with the police. I had to call them to take one of my son's away because otherwise he would have killed my daughter in-law</i></li> <li>• <i>The petrol is like the Maralinga bomb tests. It comes from the outside. So the solution has to come from the outside too. We can't do it on our own</i></li> <li>• Keep good service delivery throughout project</li> <li>• Funding for services linked to funding for staff accommodation</li> <li>• Streamline service delivery</li> <li>• Responsibility to maintain children's care, well-being and education</li> <li>• Recognition of community's actual capacity and ability to effect change and deliver services</li> </ul>



## Appendix B: Glossary

Tjukurpa	The Aboriginal ‘Dreaming’ or creation ancestry lore and law.
Anangu	Term used Pitjantjatjara speakers for “Aboriginal”
AusAID	Australia’s International Aid Agency
CAEPR	Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research
CAYLUS	Central Australian Youth Link Up Service
CLC	Central Land Council
CLP	Country Liberal Party
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
Kunmanara	Term used by Pitjantjatjara speakers for the name of a deceased person
MCI	Mutitjulu Community Incorporated
NGO	Non-government organisation
NPY	Ngaanyatjara Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara
NT	Northern Territory
OPAL	Unsniffable fuel produced by BP Petrol
ORAC	Office of the Registrar for Aboriginal Corporations
STI	Sexually Transmitted Infection
SWApS	Sector Wide Approaches
VSA	Volatile Substance Abuse

DRAFT

## **Appendix C: Suggested Reading**

Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), NGO effectiveness framework, June 2004.

Andrews, G., Submission to the Coronial inquiry into the deaths of Kunmanara Brumby and Kunmanara Coulthard of Mutitjulu Community, 20 June 2005.

Andrews, G., Economic passivity and dependency in Mutitjulu: some suggestions for change, *Discussion Paper*, March 2005.

AusAID, Fragile States: What is international experience telling us?, Ian Anderson, Principal Adviser, June 2005.

Department for International Development (DFID), Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states, January 2005.

DFID, Aid Instruments in Fragile States, Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environments Team, March 2005.

DFID, Fragile states: Defining difficult environments for poverty reduction, Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environments Team, August 2004.

DFID, Approaches to improving the delivery of social services in difficult environments, Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environments Team, March 2005.

Kretzman, J. and McKnight, J., Building communities from the inside out: A path toward finding and mobilising a community's assets, Asset-Based Community Development Institute, 1993.

OECD, Development cooperation in difficult partnerships, Development Assistance Committee, November 2001.

OECD, In the face of poverty meeting the global challenge through partnerships: DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), April 2001.

OECD, Poor performers: Basic approaches for supporting development in difficult development partnerships, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), November 2001.

Overseas Development Institute, Beyond the continuum: The changing role of aid policy in protracted crises, Humanitarian Policy Group, July 2004.

World Bank, Assessing aid: What works, what doesn't and why?, Policy Research Report, 1998.

World Bank, Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) Taskforce Report, September 2002.

## Appendix D: References

- <sup>i</sup> DFID, Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states, January 2005.
- <sup>ii</sup> Rt Hon Hilary Benn, United Kingdom Secretary of State for International Development, Forward to Why we need to work more effectively with fragile states, January 2005.
- <sup>iii</sup> *Development Cooperation in Difficult Partnerships*, Background document for the high-level OECD DAC meeting on 16 May 2002.
- <sup>iv</sup> AusAID, Fragile States: What is international experience telling us?, June 2005.
- <sup>v</sup> DFID, Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states, January 2005.
- <sup>vi</sup> DFID, Fragile states: Defining difficult environments for poverty reduction, August 2004.
- <sup>vii</sup> Andrews, G., Submission to the Coronial inquiry into the deaths of Kunmanara Brumby and Kunmanara Coulthard of Mutitjulu Community, 20 June 2005.
- <sup>viii</sup> Hughes, H., 'The economics of Indigenous deprivation and proposals for reform', Issue Analysis No.63, Centre for Independent Studies, 23 September 2005.
- <sup>ix</sup> Pearson, N., Underlying Principles of a New Policy for the Restoration of Indigenous Social Order, July 2003.
- <sup>x</sup> Ayers Rock Resort, Economic Impact Assessment Report, July 2004.
- <sup>xi</sup> Statement by Vicki Gillick for NPY Women's Council to the South Australian Coroner, 2004.
- <sup>xii</sup> Altman, J., 'Economic development and participation for remote Indigenous communities: Best practices, evident barriers and innovative solutions in the hybrid economy', Presentation to MCATSA, Sydney, 28 November 2003.
- <sup>xiii</sup> Australian Bureau of Statistics, Census of Housing and Population, Cat no. 2002.0, Indigenous profile (2001).
- <sup>xiv</sup> Mike Dillon, CEO CDSCA, State of the Regions Conference, Alice Springs, September 2004.
- <sup>xv</sup> Chauvet and Collier, Development effectiveness in fragile states: spillovers and turnarounds, 2004.
- <sup>xvi</sup> AusAID, Fragile States: What is international experience telling us?, June 2005.
- <sup>xvii</sup> OECD DAC, Development cooperation in difficult development partnerships, May 2002.
- <sup>xviii</sup> Andrews, G., Mutitjulu Working Together Project: Scoping Paper, 14 October 2004.
- <sup>xix</sup> Inquest into the deaths of Kumanjay Presley, Kunmanara Coulthard and Kunmanara Brumby [2005] NTMC 034
- <sup>xx</sup> *World Bank Group Work on Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS): A Task Force Report*, September 2002.
- <sup>xxi</sup> Johnny Tjinggo, Senior Elder and elected member of Mutitjulu Community Incorporated.
- <sup>xxii</sup> DFID, Why we need to work in fragile states, January 2005.
- <sup>xxiii</sup> Andrews, G., Mutitjulu Working Together Project: Scoping Paper, 14 October 2004.
- <sup>xxiv</sup> Andrews, G., Economic passivity and dependency in Mutitjulu: some suggestions for change, Discussion Paper, March 2005.
- <sup>xxv</sup> Andrews, G., Submission to the Coronial inquiry into the deaths of Kunmanara Brumby and Kunmanara Coulthard of Mutitjulu Community, 20 June 2005.
- <sup>xxvi</sup> NPY Women's Council Report on Petrol Sniffing in the NPY Lands, October 2004.
- <sup>xxvii</sup> Project manager's discussion with community elder in late 2004.
- <sup>xxviii</sup> Sammy Wilson, Chairman of MCI, letter to Minister Vanstone and Chief Minister Martin, August 2005.
- <sup>xxix</sup> *World Bank Group Work on Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS): A Task Force Report*, September 2002.
- <sup>xxx</sup> Statement made by Canadian aid official at OECD DAC 'Difficult Partnerships' workshop in Paris, 16 May 2002.
- <sup>xxxi</sup> World Bank, *Assessing Aid: What works, What doesn't and Why*, Washington, November 1998.
- <sup>xxxii</sup> Rotberg, R., 'Strengthening African Leadership', Foreign Affairs, July/August 2004.
- <sup>xxxiii</sup> Cornell, S., The importance and power of Indigenous self-governance: Evidence from the United States, Indigenous Governance Conference, 3-5 April 2002, Canberra.
- <sup>xxxiv</sup> Sammy Wilson, MCI Chair, discussions with Project Manager and MCI CEO in late 2004.
- <sup>xxxv</sup> Jabiru Town Development Authority, Media Release, 10 September 2004.
- <sup>xxxvi</sup> DFID, Why we need to work in fragile states, January 2005.
- <sup>xxxvii</sup> Pearson, N., On the Human Right to Misery, Mass Incarceration and Early Death, Dr Charles Perkins Memorial Oration, University of Sydney, October 2001
- <sup>xxxviii</sup> AusAID, Fragile States: What is international experience telling us?, June 2005.
- <sup>xxxix</sup> AusAID, Capacity building: Issues paper, Corporate Policy Branch, June 2003.

---

<sup>xi</sup> Westbury, N., NT Department of Chief Minister, 'The Indigenous Community Co-ordination Pilot Trial: The Leadership Challenge for Governments in supporting Indigenous Governance', paper presented to Building Effective Governance Conference, Jabiru 5-7 November 2003.

<sup>xii</sup> Altman, J., *Economic Development and Participation for Remote Indigenous Communities: Best Practice, Evident Barriers and Innovative Solutions in the Hybrid Economy*, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Presentation to the Ministerial Council for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, Sydney 28 November 2003.

<sup>xiii</sup> Harvard Project research results are available in a number of academic and other publications. See in particular the following, all by Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt: "Where's the Glue? Institutional Bases of American Indian Economic Development," *Journal of Socio-Economics* (2001); "Sovereignty and Nation-Building: The Development Challenge in Indian Country Today," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* (1998); "Successful Economic Development and Heterogeneity of Governmental Form on American Indian Reservations," in Merilee S. Grindle, ed., *Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public Sectors of Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Harvard Institute for International Development, Harvard University, 1997); "Cultural Evolution and Constitutional Public Choice: Institutional Diversity and Economic Performance on American Indian Reservations," in John Lott, ed., *Uncertainty and Evolution in Economics: Essays in Honor of Armen A. Alchian* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997); "Where Does Economic Development Really Come From? Constitutional Rule among the Contemporary Sioux and Apache," *Economic Inquiry* (1995); see also Stephen Cornell and Marta Cecilia Gil-Swedberg, "Sociohistorical Factors in Institutional Efficacy: Economic Development in Three American Indian Cases," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (1995).

<sup>xiii</sup> United Nations Development Programme, Gender Policy Note, November 2002.

<sup>xiv</sup> Happy Mutata, address to Mutitjulu Community Incorporated in June 2005.

<sup>xiv</sup> Centre for Global Development, On the brink: Weak states and US national security, May 2004.

<sup>xvi</sup> *Review of Incentives in the Aid Program*, Internal AusAID Working Paper, December 2002.

<sup>xvii</sup> Beadman, B., Do Indigenous Youth have a Dream?, Menzies Research Centre, Canberra, 2004.

Hughes, H., 'The economics of Indigenous deprivation and proposals for reform', Issues Analysis, Centre for Independent Studies, No.63, 23 September 2005.

Noel Pearson, On the human rights to misery, mass incarceration and early death, Dr Charles Perkins Memorial Oration, University of Sydney, 25 October 2001.

<sup>xviii</sup> ARC (July 2002). *Submission to the Higher Education Review*, and [www.arc.gov.au/strat\\_plan/performance.htm](http://www.arc.gov.au/strat_plan/performance.htm)

<sup>xix</sup> Comment by OECD official at 'fragile states' meeting in Paris in 2002.

<sup>i</sup> Andrews, G., Mutitjulu *Working Together Project* Manager, Submission to the Coronial inquiry into the deaths of Kunmanara Brumby and Kunmanara Coulthard of Mutitjulu Community, 20 June 2005.

<sup>ii</sup> Noel Pearson, On the human rights to misery, mass incarceration and early death, Dr Charles Perkins Memorial Oration, University of Sydney, 25 October 2001.

<sup>iii</sup> World Bank Group, Task force report on low-income countries under stress, September 2002.

<sup>iii</sup> DFID, Why we need to work more effectively with fragile states, January 2005.

<sup>iv</sup> DFID, Why we need to work more effectively with fragile states, January 2005.

<sup>lv</sup> Comments by Gregory Andrews to ABC National Radio, PM, 10 October 2005, Coroner slams governments for ignoring petrol sniffing, reporter Anne Barker.